

1489. E. 59.

REASONS

FOR A

WAR,

In Order to Establish the

Tranquillity *and* Commerce

OF

EUROPE.

PAX *Quæritur* BELLO:

L O N D O N :

Printed for A. DODD, and R. WALKER, without *Temple-Bar*; E. NUTT, and E. SMITH, at the *Royal-Exchange*; and sold by the Booksellers and Pamphlet-Shops, Mercuries and Hawkers of *London* and *Westminster*, 1729.

[Price Six-pence.]

REASONS

FOR


W. A. R.

W. A. R.





REASONS, &c.



EACE or *War* is the Question; it has been so for some Years, and yet 'tis not answered, nor is it likely to be answered for some Time longer.

THE KING Himself says so; His MAJESTY has told us from the Throne in express Terms, That *the Fate of Europe is still held in SUSPENCE, and labouring under the Difficulties which unavoidably attend a doubtful and unsettled Condition.*

IN another Place His MAJESTY is pleased to call the present Appearance of Things a *State of Uncertainty*. Thus my Authority is good; the Question is still before us, and we are at Liberty to argue upon the probable Event. But this is not all,

I have not only His MAJESTY's Words to confirm me, when I say, We are in a *State of Uncertainty*, but I have it still from the same ROYAL Oracle, *That our present Circumstances may induce some to think, that an ACTUAL WAR is preferable to such a doubtful and IMPERFECT PEACE.*

I proceed therefore to build upon this solid Foundation, being one of those who are induc'd by our present Circumstances so to think, viz. that an *actual WAR is indeed preferable to such a doubtful PEACE.*

BUT a Question still offers it self here, namely, What Particulars they are in our present Circumstances, which may induce us to think thus; for, doubtless PEACE, abstracted from such Circumstances, and which are Accidents to it, is in itself infinitely preferable to War, and especially to a wealthy, trading Nation, such as we (without boasting) may allow ourselves to be,

N.B. HERE

N. B. HERE I might make a very profitable Excursion upon the infinite Advantages of *Peace*, to this Nation in particular; and how to be preferr'd to *War* upon all Occasions; and so might harangue upon the Wisdom of His MAJESTY's Conduct, and that of his Ministers, in endeavouring to preserve the present Peace (if possible) and prevent the Miseries of War:

BUT I am call'd another Way, and this is not my present Business. I am ready to grant, and I believe we are all satisfied, that the KING has been prevail'd upon, *by his just Regard for the Ease and Interest of his People* (to use His MAJESTY's own Words again) *to suffer some temporary Inconveniences, with the Prospect of a safe and honourable Peace, rather than precipitately to kindle a War, &c.* As (I say) I hope we are all satisfied with this, so I may add, that I believe we are all convinced, His Majesty will not be *backward to do himself and the Nation Justice, if Occasion calls upon him to begin a War.*

IT seems then, the immediate Question before us turns upon this one Point, namely, Whether we may not be allowed to THINK, that there is now *a real Occasion* to enter into a War.

THE

THE Question is of Moment; I put it fairly, though with Caution, wording it in the very Terms of *His Majesty's* Speech, which I hope I may say allows the *Enquiry*; for if our present Circumstances induce us to think thus, then *the Reasons for a War* are to be found in Our *present Circumstances*: Let us search there for them.

ONE of the Grievances of our *present Circumstances*, I mean, as we find them generally complain'd of, is, the *extraordinary Expence* we are at, and have been obliged to *bear* for several Years past, to keep ourselves in a fighting Posture, occasioned by the *Uncertainty* of Things, not knowing which Way the *Fate of Europe* would turn.

I have often heard of an expensive *War*, but very rarely of an expensive *Peace*, 'till *now*; whereas some tell us, we are annually *now* at as much Expence as would be *sufficient* to carry on an *actual* War, I must add, that I think those People carry it too far, and I cannot allow the Word *sufficient*; at the same Time granting it would go a great Way to be so, and, as Things might happen, might come up to it.

BUT to argue a little upon the *Expence* thereof, and dismiss that Part as I go.

I. THE *Expence* of a War may be greater, but then 'tis very likely the *Continuance* of it might be shorter, and, if vigorously carried on, we might hope to see it issued in a Year or two; whereas the present State of *Uncertainty* has already kept us languishing under the Torture of *Expectation* near four Years, the Pain of which is generally greater than the Thing itself, whether in Good or Evil. How much longer we may be kept in the same Condition, we cannot yet see, and for this Reason think the Pain of our *uneasy Peace* much worse than that of an *actual War*. War, like a *Fever*, attacks the whole Body at once with Violence and Impetuosity, but if repuls'd by Strength of Constitution, and the wholesome Helps of Medicine, goes off also at once, and the Health is better established; but a *lingring, doubtful* State of Negotiation, being a Suspence between *Peace* and *War*, is like an *Ague*, which comes now *hot*, then *cold*, intermitting and periodical; now shaking with Cold, then burning with Heat; sometimes exhausting by a tedious Sweat, at other Times giving Intervals of Health; one while threatening with Death, and then flattering with the Hopes of Life; that the poor Patient may be said to be neither *dead* nor *alive*, but between both.

THUS,

THUS, in our present State of *Uncertainty*, we are, as it were, exhausting our *Spirits*, and sweating out the *Vigour* of the Nation, and yet know not the Issue; whereas in a War, though the *Expence*, as his *Majesty* is pleased to observe, *may be unknown*, yet in all Probability it may not be long.

II. In a War we have a Hazard, *especially in a War with Spain*, that we may now and then fall in with such a Prize as may largely contribute towards, if not fully supply the *Expence* of a whole Campaign. One *well-freighted Galleon* would pay for equipping a whole Fleet. Sir *Francis Drake* brought home in one Ship about two and thirty Ton of Silver, an *immense Treasure* in *those Days*, besides a very great Quantity of Gold and Jewels. Our Fleet at *Vigo* took from the *Spaniards*, I dare not say brought home, a prodigious Wealth. And the *Spaniards* must be very vigilant and lucky, if, in a War with *England*, and well followed on Our Side, nothing should fall into our Hands, neither at Sea nor on Shore. On the other-hand, in this *State of Uncertainty* we are sure of a great *Expence*, and no Room to make Ourselves Amends upon the Enemy, no Reprisals in View, nothing but

but a continual going out, without Hopes of any thing coming in; the Expence now in a continued Stream flowing out from the very *Vitals*, and, like a Bleeding to *Death*, tho' the Orifice be small, and the Death slow, yet is as *certain*, and as fatal as a cutting off the Head: For this Reason I cannot but think a *War* much more desirable, in which, beginning it with our *full Strength*, and in a State of *Health* and *Vigour*, we may hope for *Peace* by the Force of our Arms; whereas now the Strength and Vigour of the State sinks away under a *passive Indolence*, wherein we may be said, as before, neither to live or die, but to perish in a Kind of Non-resistance, like one bound Hand and Foot, and surrounded with *Pick-pockets* and *Thieves*.

III. THE Expence we are now at, notwithstanding it is *so extraordinary*, does not seem to promise, that we shall by it lessen the Expence of a War when it falls; whereas, on the contrary, it will not fail to make us less able to undertake and carry it on. It cannot be denied but, as I have said above, the *present* Expence grievously exhausts us, and the more so, as we see our Condition not at all the *better*, and the End not the nearer in View. Nor is it a lessening

B

fening the Grief of this Condition, that we see the Enemy *triumphing*, upon that very Foundation, *viz.* That we spend vast Sums, they little or nothing; that we bleed away our Strength and Vitals, and they rather improve and increase their own: For Example, by getting home their Galleons, and bringing over their Treasure, and the like, they purchase Friends, make Alliances, hire auxiliary Troops, buy and build Ships, and every way grow *stronger* and *stronger*, while we visibly *decline*. For this Reason therefore, I think 'tis Time we should begin the War, before we are *any weaker*, and before they are *any stronger*; and not let one of the weakest and most unperforming Nations in *Christendom* bully us, and upbraid us with making no Figure in the World.

IV. ANOTHER Reason is taken from the *Uneasiness* of the whole Nation, in the present *unsettled* Condition, and their general Inclination, which seems to run all this Way, as what they think to be the only Remedy for the present Disorders. I foresee it may be objected here, that if this Reason is allowed, then the Humours of the *People* must be a Rule to the KING and Government, and you remove the Prerogative of making *Peace* and *War* from the *Prince* to the *People*.

BUT

BUT this is a Mistake; for tho' the People's *Sense* may not be the Prince's *Rule* directing or imposing, it may notwithstanding be his *Reason* moving and perswading; nor is it below the Majesty of a Prince to take his Measures sometimes from this *Rise*, and in some Measure guiding his Resolutions and Councils thereby, The wisest of Princes in past Ages have done so, and acted accordingly: And this was originally the Occasion of *Kings* and *Emperors* calling together their Nobility, and principal Men among the People, in extraordinary Cases, to advise and consult what was to be *done*; that is to say, to consider what to do for the *Common Safety*; and perhaps it might not be very difficult to trace the Beginning of the Assemblies abroad call'd *Dyets*, *States of the Kingdom*, *Great Councils*, *Cortez*, the *Divans*, and even *Parliaments* themselves, to this Original. But I leave those Things to their proper Place.

It is evident, that the present Affair turns upon the same foot of Reasoning. The long *State of Uncertainty* which we have been in near four Years, has made us all solicitous about the *Issue* of Things. The KING Himself has, in some Manner, *allowed*, I do not say *acknowledged*, that it is just and reasonable *we should desire to be inform-*

ed of the present Situation of the publick Affairs; and His MAJESTY tells us from the Throne, That He is sensible the Parliament are met together in Expectation of being inform'd of them, and likewise in Expectation of receiving Satisfaction about them. This is the very Thing I speak of, and I cannot have a better Authority.

As the Houses are met in the great Council of PARLIAMENT with *this Expectation*, and that it is just they should *expect* and *desire*, &c. so 'tis not to be doubted but that the People without Doors are big with the same *Expectation*, and that with the same Justice and Reasonableness they may be allowed to *desire* some Kind of *Satisfaction* about it.

It may be true, that the People without Doors are more impatient in waiting the *Issue* of the publick Councils, shew themselves more uneasy under the Delays which, however necessary, are made either *abroad* or at *home*, and are apt to express their *Uneasiness* and *Dislikes* in plainer Terms. But this notwithstanding may be kept in too, within the Bounds of Duty and Submission to their Governors; and if this is *so*, we may make Allowances for their *Warmth*, from the Nature of all popular Motions, which is fierce and impetuous; but we do
not

not find them often wrong in the *Meaning*, even though they may be so in the *Manner*. This is that Sense of the People which, I say, wise Governments do very often give a great Regard to in *Christendom*: I am not therefore laying the Stress upon a tumultuous and disaffected *Clamour* among the People; that is a *Species* of Rebellion, and merits to be treated as such.

In the present Case, by the Sense of the People I mean their *calm* and *just* Expectations and Desires, which, at this Juncture, are evidently for a *final* Result of the lingering and uncertain Councils or Negotiations abroad; and that, one Way or other, they may be held no longer in Suspence: They do indeed submit the Event to His MAJESTY'S Wisdom as to *Peace* or *War*, but as they seem to observe, that the *Peace* is not nearer in Perspective, than the aforesaid *lingring* Treaties and Negotiations left it, and that the Conclusion of Things is not so likely to be favourable that Way, they apparently desire that Exchange, which, as His MAJESTY has happily express'd it, is *very easy to be made at any Time*; that is, in few Words, as we had it once aptly expressed in King *William's* Time, on a like Occasion, *the Pulse of the Nation beats high for a War*.

Not

NOR that the People of *Great-Britain* are desirous of a War, as *such*, or for the *Sake* of it; that would be to suppose the People were in Love with *Taxes*, and all the other Miseries, Hardships, and Losses which naturally attend a War: Nor is it that they do not look upon War as a Calamity in itself; for such indeed it is: But if they *desire* a War, it is because it seems to be the more immediate and direct Way of obtaining a safe and honourable Peace, and that they see no other whereby they may the easier come at it. The *Gordian Knot* is too hard to untye, so long Time has been taken up, and so much Money spent already in just Endeavours to untye it, that they may be justly impatient for Leave and Command; that the glittering Sword may cut through it at once, and, it is to be hoped, extricate the People of *Great-Britain* out of all their present Difficulties, and restore them to their former Tranquillity and Commerce.

Now, according to our *Title*, if *Peace* is only to be found in *War*, then to desire War is as just as to desire Peace; nay, to desire a War is the Way to obtain Peace, and so the *Pulse of the People* may be a good Reason why we should wish for a War.

N. B. THAT

N. B. THAT I may be clearly understood on this nice and critical Subject, I desire the Reader to take Notice, I do not say those Reasons which I suggest sway with the People to desire a *War*, are *universal*, and have influenc'd the *whole Nation*; there may be some whose *Notions* differ, and whose *Pacificks* run as high another Way, who are for buying *Peace* at any Rate, and who are so phlegmatick in Matters of *War*, that they would *stoop* to any Delay, and be impos'd upon to any Degree, so that a *Peace* may but be obtained.

BUT I follow the Royal Clue in my Observation, and firmly believe there are so many of the People of *Great-Britain* of the same Opinion, that it fully justifies my saying the *PEOPLE* are for a *War*, because, concurring heartily with *HIS MAJESTY*, they are generally for no *Peace*, but such as shall be *safe and honourable*; and as they do not see the *Enemy* at all inclin'd to yield to an *honourable and safe Peace*, they are desirous of a *War*, because they believe nothing but *Fighting* will procure it, and withal are of Opinion, they are *able* to *box* him into it.

IN

IN a Word, as the Difficulty seems great, and the Method tedious, of obtaining a *safe and honourable Peace*, in the present Way of Treaty and Negotiation, and that this *Difficulty* is the Reason of the People's present *Uneasiness* for a War, so their *Desire* being thus well grounded, is to me, and I think to all other considering People, a good Reason for a speedy, if not immediate War.

AND here again I think I have the Royal Concurrence forming the glorious Resolution, which His Majesty has express'd in His late Speech, upon the Subject of *Peace and War*, that *it will be incumbent upon us to bring this important Transaction to a speedy and certain Decision*. What is this but the very same Thing as the People's desiring to come to a speedy Result, and if the *Spaniards* go on to drive off, and run out the Negotiations in Length, as they have done, to bring them to it by the *Sword*? This also His Majesty concurs with, only express'd in stronger Terms; *If this*, that is, the Blessing of Peace, mentioned by the KING just before, cannot be had, that then *the Allies may unite with Vigour and Resolution, and exert themselves in procuring it, &c.* what is this but making the *just Desire* of the

ple be a Reason for a *War*, and doubtless it is so, as we shall see presently.

V. ANOTHER Reason for a War is, the apparent Delay us'd in a political and designing Manner by the *Spaniards* in all these Negotiations; as if they haughtily resolved to hold the World in *Suspence*, 'till they thought fit to give *Peace* or *War*; or as if they had some *resolv'd Design* carrying on in *private*, which it was not in our Reach to penetrate; that they would have the *final Result* of *Europe's* Councils in their own Power, and have *Peace* or *War* in their Choice.

It is true, the *Spaniards* are a stiff, reserv'd People, whose Councils are *sometimes* impenetrable, though I think they are far from being so *now*; their Conduct has been too open for some Years, and we are (even without Doors) not unable to guess what they aim at; which, if I am not mistaken, heightens our Earnestness, and is in itself a Reason for a *War*; I mean, their apparent Sollicitations at all the Courts where they think they have any Influence, to dispossess the Crown of *Great-Britain* of their late Acquisitions of *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon*, Places which all the Power of *Spain*, were it much more formidable than it is *now*, is not able to take from us by the *Sword*,
C but

This section was incorrectly imposed by the printer.

more or less, is not the present Question; but whether they are the *Possessions* of the Crown of *Great-Britain*, won fairly in a War by the *Valour* of our Troops, and conceded freely to *Us* by the Peace; with the Consent and Concurrence both of *France* and *Spain*; annex'd to the *British* Empire by all the requisite Stipulations of the Powers of *Europe* that can be desired, and received as such by the United *British* Powers, *Civil* and *Military*; now I can no more believe His Majesty will *bear* to see the Dominions of the *British* Government made less, while He wears the Crown, than He found them, than I can *fear*, that all *Spain* and her *Allies*, be they who they will, are able to *take* them from *Us*.

Also I cannot but say this, as to the *Importance* of those Places; whether they are so necessary to *Us* as some would imagine, I do not enquire, but if they were not of the greatest *Importance*, and absolutely *necessary* to the *Spaniards*, why all this *Difficulty* about them? And it will be a Question worth deciding hereafter, whether their being so absolutely *necessary* to the *Enemy*, is not a good Reason to *Us*, why we should not part with them?

Now

the *Spanish* Colonies, vulgarly (tho' ignorantly) called the *South-Seas*; the *exclusive* Right of Commerce to the *East-Indies*, invaded now by the *Ostend* Company, and the like: But the Word *Possessions*, or the Possessions of *Great-Britain* can, in my Opinion, mean nothing but the Possessions of *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon*. I would not take upon me to explain His MAJESTY's Meaning, and (above all) would he very far from *misrepresenting* it; but we see no Possessions of *Great-Britain* any where in the *Spanish* Reach but those, nor do we observe them to aim at depriving *Us* of any other.

THESE, no Doubt, make them *uneasy*, and may they ever be their *Terror* in our Possession; for as His Majesty seems to join with his People, in making and preserving the Possessions of *Great-Britain* be an *Essential* to a Peace; the restless Intrigues of the *Spaniards*, to get those Possessions *disunited* and *torn* from his Royal Crown, may, without Offence I hope, be esteem'd a sufficient Reason for a *War*.

It may be expected, I should enter here upon a Discourse of the *Importance* of those two Places, of which, I am told, some People, besides the *Spaniards*, envy *Great-Britain* so much the Possession of. But 'tis foreign to my Purpose, be they of Importance

but they flatter themselves it seems, they shall obtain them by *Treaty*.

If this be the Drift of the Delays and Demurrs which the *Spaniards* make, as we have great Reason to believe; is it not Time to put an End to all such *Negotiations*, as nourish those Hopes in the Enemy, and let them see in good Earnest, that if they expect to recover those Possessions of *Great-Britain*, it must be by the *Sword*, and no otherwise, and that we are still able to maintain what we so gloriously *acquir'd*, by a *War*?

THIS also I take to be evidently His Majesty's Sentiment, (for I would keep up to that happy Standard with which I began) I say, this seems to be the KING's Sentiments, in that Part of His Majesty's Speech which says, *If a Conclusion can be put to this important Transaction*; that is to say, if a *Peace* can be had, His Majesty should be *well-pleased* with it. But how? The Answer is plain, *consistent with the Security and Preservation of the Rights, Privileges, and Possessions of Great-Britain*.

What can be more clearly express'd? The *Rights and Privileges of Great-Britain* mentioned here, may intimate the Privileges of Commerce (stipulated in former Treaties) for the Subjects of *Great-Britain*, to the People

VI. THE *happy* Prospect of *Success* is to me a strong concurring Reason for a *War*. War is a Game full of Hazards; a Lottery in which many Blanks rise up to one Prize, and there is much Treasure to risque on both Sides, much Loss and much Blood, it should not therefore be rashly engaged in on any Account whatsoever. But if ever a *War* promis'd well, I think this does; the *Enemy* is so far from being *formidable*, that he is rather fit to jest at, than fight with; what is his terrible Navy, which he is now equipping with so much Profusion of Expence, and which, they tell us, shall consist of 60 Men of War of the Line? I would not talk of them *a la Gascoigne*, and by way of Bluster like a Tarr, but I would calmly ask any skilful Seaman, whether a private Man or an Officer, whether a meer Captain or a Flag-Officer, I say, I would ask if he would not freely take the Fate of his Life with 25 Sail of good *English* Third-Rates, well mann'd and provided, to engage that whole Navy? I leave it unanswered, for every *Reader* to judge of.

WHAT then have we to fear from such an *Enemy*? and why then should *We* not be all unanimous for a War? Especially considering the *Usage Great-Britain* has received from them:

to be come to this Crisis, *No Peace*, on one Side, *without giving up our Possessions*, and *No Peace*, on the other, *without their being preserv'd*. Why then it follows, in my Opinion, that *No Peace* is the Word, on one Side or other: If then such a *Peace* as His Majesty declares He must have, or none, cannot be had, is not such a *Negative* a *sufficient Reason* for a War?

NOTHING seems to be more reasonable, in my Opinion, than taking *vigorous* and *warm Measures* at this Time; that the *Spaniards* may see there is no Room for them to expect, *Great Britain* will part with any of her *Possessions* on this Account, and she may flatter herself no more with such *Expectations*; that she may see, if she will have those Places, she must *fight* for, and win them by the *Sword*, or not at all; a Method she has twice tried already without Success. Perhaps the *Difficulty* which appears in the Attempt to take them by Force, and the *Impossibility* of obtaining them any other Way, may bring them to acquiesce, and content themselves where they are. Thus a *vigorous War* might, I say, bring the *Spaniards* to their Senses, and set all to rights on that Side; which brings me to a sixth Reason, namely,

Now what but the Sword can decide this Question? If all the Delay us'd by the Enemy in these *Treaties*, all their *spinning out* the *Negotiations* to such an unreasonable Length, is apparently done upon this Account, as we are told it is, what have we to hope for? We find, as well the *Imperial Court*, as that of *Madrid*, hang back, and no Conclusion made; nothing adjusted; the KING tells his Parliament expressly, that *there is no definitive Answer return'd by either of them, nor the Project of a PROVISIONAL Treaty either ACCEPTED or REJECTED; but the Fate of Europe is still held in Suspense*; that is to say, if I understand it right, that the *Imperial Court*, and that of *Madrid*, by these Delays hold the Fate of *Europe* still in *Suspense*; I hope then it may be added without Offence, that these *Delays* are a good Reason for a War.

CERTAINLY *Europe* has Reason to be impatient, and not to suffer her Fate to be any longer held in *Suspense*; and as to *Great-Britain*, seeing His Majesty has declared so expressly, that the *Peace* He expects must be such as is consistent with *preserving* His Possessions, as well as the *Rights* and *Privileges* of His Subjects, and that the *Spaniards* seem to insist upon a Re-union of *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon*, the Affair then seems
to

them: This made me say above, it is a concurring Reason with those mentioned before; for Example, Consider who it is that has thus *beld the Fate of Europe so long in Suspense*, who it is that has kept us *all in a State of Uncertainty*, and has receiv'd the just and reasonable *Proposals of Peace*, without either *accepting or rejecting* them; which is a manifest Contempt put upon our Allies; consider, I say, they are only or chiefly *Spaniards* that treat Us thus; *Spain*, whose Commerce is so much at *Our Mercy*, whose *rich Colonies* are, as it were, in *Our Hands*; whom We are able to beat out of the Sea, and, as I might say, to blow out of the World with *Our Fleet*, if *His Majesty* would exert his Power in doing Justice upon them; in a word, they are not able to look Us in the Face, especially at Sea; and shall not this *Weakness* of the *Enemy* we are to engage with, be *another Reason* for a War?

We are told indeed great Things of the Emperor's being confederated with *Spain*, and of his *formidable* Power. I am ready to grant all that Reason requires of the Number and Goodness of the *Imperial* Troops, not to talk as if We trembled at them neither; but it is no Affront to His *Imperial* Majesty, or lessening of his Power, to say, he is *na greater* than he is, and particularly

larly to affirm, the *Emperor* is no-body at Sea.

THAT the *Imperialists* have no Ships, is a Truth no-body will dispute, so that in the *naval* Part of the War, the *Emperor* can have very little to do; and therefore, as I take it, in case of a War the Weight of the Quarrel will lie, and the great Point be decided, in a War with *Spain*; so that the *Spaniards* will have no Helpers, unless they depend upon the Czar of *Muscovy's* doing any thing for them, which must be our *inexcusable* Fault if we do not prevent. The *Weakness* therefore of the Enemy, as I hinted above, is farther demonstrated to be a good Reason for a War.

VII. THE Necessity of protecting Our Commerce in the *West-Indies*, which, notwithstanding an agreed Cessation, and all the usual Stipulations thereof, is still insulted in a *shameful* and *dishonourable* Manner, by the *Spaniards*; our Ships taken, our Seamen barbarously us'd, our Demands of Reparation banter'd and ridicul'd, and, in a word, the same *Violences* us'd as are practis'd in Time of open declar'd War. It seems not only just, but highly necessary, that a *Redress* be had in such a Case; it being a Method contrary to the Law of Nations to

D violate

violate an agreed Cessation, and not make Reparation, upon a Complaint made in a peaceable Manner.

I believe there is hardly an Example in History, where a Nation, so superior in *naval Power*, so able to do themselves Justice, and to *revenge* their own *Wrongs* with Advantage, has been so provok'd, and have shewn so much Moderation in their Resentment: But by how much the greater Patience these *Injuries* and *Insults* have been born with, by so much the stronger are the Arguments for *putting an End* to them now.

I do not undertake to determine the Bounds of Royal Forbearance, and when it is, or is not Time for His Majesty's Justice to take place; be those Things as the KING pleases: But, as I observ'd at first, we may speak without Doors our Opinions, what are, or are not, to us *sufficient Reasons* to wish for a *War*.

I make no Question, when such a Thing shall happen, and when the Government think it Time to begin with the *Spaniards*, we shall let them see, it was not for want of *Power* that we did not call them to Account sooner, any more than it was for want of *Provocation*, and that *Spain* may still *pay dear* for all these *Violences*.

INDEED the *Treatment* which we have received from the *Spaniards*, during this *agreed Cessa-*

Cessation, and especially in the *West-Indies*, has been the more provoking, as it has wounded us in a very tender Part of our Trade, namely, our free Communication with our own Colonies, by which the supplying of our Island Colonies with Provisions from those on the Continent, has been very much interrupted, by which Means they have been very great *Sufferers*: The *Complaints* of our *Merchants* likewise have been very loud on this Subject, tho' hitherto without Redress. And as I make no Doubt, but that their united Endeavours, together with the Assistance of the Government, may yet *ballance* Accompts with the *Spaniards*, and pay home all those Scores with Interest; so the View, and, above all, the Justice of doing it, is the Reason why we think it should be gone about; for why should our *West-Indic* Trade, which is in itself so valuable an Article to *Us*, be suffered to be thus assaulted by the *Spaniards*?

VIII. I need not enlarge here upon the several Ways and Means, as well as particular Places, by which the *English* are able to make themselves amends upon the *Spaniards* in the *West Indies*. By *English* here, I mean the British Merchants in their *private* Capacities, as well as *Nationally* considered. Those who have read the Hi-

Stories of the several gallant Actions of our private *Men of War* in the South Seas, even not reckoning the Free Booters or Robbers, who we call *Buccaniers*, may easily line out the Way to themselves, or others to follow their Steps.

AND tho' it may be true, that the *Spaniards* are in better Condition on that Coast now than they were formerly; their Towns better fortify'd, and their Forts better provided with Guns and Stores of Ammunition, and also with better Garrisons; yet it is very true likewise, that a *proportioned Force* may be sent, and that in such a Manner, as they may be able to land in the Face of the *Enemy*; and, which is more than all the rest, may undertake to *keep* and *defend* any Conquests they may make, and so may do as is done at *Gibraltar*, namely, get such a Footing there as all the Power of *Spain* may not be able to drive them out.

IT is not my Business to mark out such *particular Places* at this Time, which would be but to give the *Enemy* Notice to provide against it. But to sum it up in a Word, How easy would it be for the *English* to dispossess the *Spaniards* of the whole Kingdom of *Chili*? the richest in Gold, the weakest in Strength, and capable of being improv'd,
even

even to Prodigy, far beyond any of the other Dominions of the *Spaniards* in *America*, of which I could give unanswerable Proofs, if that were any Part of my present Work.

I might add here a great many other *Reasons* for a War, which I think are weighty in themselves; but I shall only name a few of them: Such as,

IX. THE Justice due to the Honour of the *British* Nation, which seems to have suffered *some Affront* in the late hostile Proceedings of *Spain*; and calls upon Us to act in its Defence with a differing Temper than we have yet shewn, and not suffer Ourselves to be *insulted* any longer: Nor does saying this, so much as seem to take it out of the Hands of our Superiors; for we speak all with Submission to His Majesty's Pleasure, as we do to his Authority, and only as above, give an Opinion without Doors. Yet even *without Doors* we may see a little, and judge also what *should* be by what has been. We daily hear some Men at *Home*, and probably 'tis more so *Abroad*, flouting at our National Conduct, as they are pleas'd to call it, and depreciating their own Conuntry; bantring our *Pacificks*, and taxing the Management of Things, with what they call *tamely Suffering a contemptible*

tible Nation to injure and affront Us. I am well assured We are at this Time in a Condition not to be Bully'd by the greatest Nation in Europe, no, not by several of them put together, especially at Sea; and therefore 'tis no Boasting if we should see the Motto of the *Scotch Thistle* upon our *naval Power*.

Nemo me impune Lacessit.

Nor should I fear any Thing for Our Land-Service, if once we could see His Majesty at the Head of 50000 *Englishmen* in the Field; and therefore I cannot but thk. we have *Reason* to wish for a *War*.

X. WE may be driven by the Necessity of Things into a War, after we have long waited in a hesitating Posture between War and Peace; and at last, when we are exhausted by a long lingring in this State of *Dying Life*, may be worse able to support the Expence of it, and to bear up under the weight of it than we are *now*. Certainly then it must be better for Us to chuse that *now* by Our own voluntary Election, which we are sure to be driven to *afterwards* by a meer Necessity.

XI. As those long Delays have created *Grudgings, Murmurs, false Stories and Dis-*
contents

contents among the People, so that the long Continuance of them may increase those Discontents, Jealousies and Murmurings, till they issue, as they frequently do, in greater Disorders. It is true, that the *Murmurs* and *Discontents* of the common People are not always to be regarded, and ought rather to be check'd and reprehended. But as no wise Government chuses to give their Subjects Cause of Discontent, and to fill their Minds and Mouths with Uneasiness and Clamour; and as in this Case His Majesty has been graciously pleased to shew a tender Regard to the *Satisfaction* of his Subjects; I think I may allow, that the apparent *Uneasiness* of the People of *Great Britain*, encreas'd by these *Delays* and *Uncertainties*, is at least a good Reason for a War, as the immediate visible Means of removing them.

XII. It seems, the only way to convince any wavering Ally, if such there are, that we are in Earnest, and that we have not dallied with the World all this while in jest; above all, it will convince the Enemy, I mean the *Spaniards*, that we are not only in Earnest with them, but that we are not to be jested with by them any longer. Indeed the whole Scene has seem'd for some Time as if it had been a meer Farce, or a
 Piece

Piece of *Mock-management*, between Jest and Earnest, I mean, on their Side, and I see nothing but a *War* will effectually expound this Riddle: A *War* will set all right, stop the Mouth of *Clamour*, compose the *Heads of the People*, which at present may be said to be a little turn'd; a *War* will put the Nation's Spirits in Circulation, dissolve and disperse all our lethargick Mists and Vapours, and restore us to our *Political Senses*, which for some Time have been bewilder'd with Doubts and Amusement. In a word, a *WAR*, a *WAR* is; wherever I come, the unanimous Voice of the People.

Pax queritur Bello.

F I N I S.



